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Abstract 
The education system has been a quintessential state apparatus of nation-building since the emergence of the 
modern nation-state; however, recent comparative studies demonstrate the growing presence of cosmopolitanism 
in education policies and school curricula around the world. This trend indicates that the education system now 
operates according to two different institutional logics, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. To understand how the 
education system negotiates the potential contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, in this paper, I 
analyze the case of postwar Japanese education. Theoretically, I synthesize studies of institutional logics and 
social movements: while the former shed light on a contradiction between different institutional logics as a source 
of political contestation, the latter help to explain how political actors select solutions to the contradiction. 
Empirically, I show how a series of education reforms modified the original solution that had prioritized 
cosmopolitanism over nationalism, culminating in the new Fundamental Law of Education that redefined the two 
institutional logics as symbiotic. My analysis thus suggests that the Japanese education system is evolving into a 
state apparatus of cosmopolitan nation-building in an increasingly global world. 
 
Keywords: globalization, education, politics, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, institutional change 
 
1. Introduction 
In social science disciplines, the education system has been considered a quintessential state apparatus of nation-
building that inculcates national identity and naturalizes the nation-state as the most important unit of social life 
(Gellner 1997; Smith 1998). Against a backdrop of globalization, however, recent comparative studies have 
demonstrated that school curricula define students increasingly as members of ‘world society’ according to 
cosmopolitan conceptions anchored in world culture (Benavot and Braslavsky 2007). This worldwide trend in 
education first emerged after World War II and accelerated in the past few decades in conjunction with the 
expansion of transnational economic, political and social activities (Sassen 2003), and the intensification of 
awareness of the world as a whole (Robertson 1992). 
 
Hiro SAITO is an assistant professor of Sociology and faculty member of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of 
Hawai‘i at M_anoa. His research interests include social theory, culture, education and collective memory. His recent 
publications include ‘Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitan Education’ in The Journal of Curriculum Studies (2010) and 
‘Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitanism’ in Sociological Theory (forthcoming). He can be reached at the Department of 
Sociology, University of Hawai‘i at M_anoa, Sanders Hall 247, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA, or by e-mail at: 
hs9@hawaii.edu. 
 
*For their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper I thank the SSJJ editors and reviewers, as well as John C. 
Campbell, Howard Kimeldorf, and the participants of the Power, History, and Social Change Workshop at the University of 
Michigan. 
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The ongoing transformation of education systems across the world raises an important question about the 
relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The question concerns the very nature of the education 
system, specifically its ‘institutional logic’ (Scott 2001; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). An institutional logic is a set 
of assumptions, categories and norms that organize relevant actors’ identities and practices to reproduce a given 
institution: institutional logics are integral to the structuration of all institutions. Since the modern nation-state 
first emerged, nationalism has been a dominant institutional logic of the education system. Nationalism prioritizes 
the ‘nation’ over other categories and legitimates education policies, school curricula, and reforms that are 
consistent with its logic. In contrast, cosmopolitanism prioritizes the ‘world’ and legitimates discourses and 
practices that transcend the nation. The worldwide trend in education therefore points to the emergence of an 
‘institutional contradiction’ (Friedland and Alford 1991) between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. How, then, 
do political actors negotiate and resolve the institutional contradiction in organizing education policies, school 
curricula, and reforms in an increasingly global world? 
 
To answer that question and re-examine the nature of the education system as a state apparatus of nation-building, 
this paper analyzes the case of post-World War II Japan. Since Japan has grappled with the relationship between 
the nation and the world throughout its modern history (Robertson 1992; Delanty 2003; Lincicome 2009), it offers 
extensive data on the negotiation between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The Japanese data are not only 
extensive but also clean: that Japan has a centralized education system based on the Fundamental Law of 
Education (FLE) makes it relatively easy to observe interactions between the two institutional logics of education, 
in contrast with decentralized education systems that lack foundational rules at the national level. 
 
Below, I first elaborate the nature of the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in 
education. Next, I introduce the theory of social movements to clarify mechanisms that mediate how political 
actors select solutions to the institutional contradiction and how they stabilize or challenge the selected solution. 
In light of the theories of institutional contradiction and social movements, I then examine the history of the 
Japanese education system since the end of World War II. The historical analysis illustrates how political actors 
gradually modified the original solution that had prioritized cosmopolitanism over nationalism during the Allied 
Occupation, eventually replacing it with the new FLE that legitimated the composite of the two institutional 
logics. 
 
2. Institutional Logics of Education 
When nationalism as a political doctrine gathered force in Europe from the early 19th century onward, the state 
began to deploy the education system systematically to homogenize the population in terms of national culture 
and identity (Gellner 1983; Smith 1998). According to Pierre Bourdieu's succinct formulation, the state deploys 
the education system to establish and inculcate ‘common forms and categories of perception and appreciation … 
in short, state forms of classification’ constitutive of ‘(national) common sense … [and] what is commonly 
designated as national identity (or, in a more traditional language, national character)’ (Bourdieu 1999: 61, 68). In 
the 20th century, the education system as a state apparatus of nation-building came to be institutionalized 
throughout the world (Thomas et al. 1987). As a dominant institutional logic of education, nationalism legitimated 
policies and curricula that prioritized the nation (and its auxiliary concepts, such as ‘national identity’ and 
‘national interest’) over other categories. 
 
Studies of globalization suggest, however, that the link between the state and the nation has been reconfigured 
significantly in recent decades (Held et al. 1999; Sassen 2007). Specifically, they have shown that the state 
partially denationalizes its institutions to facilitate transnational economic, political, and social activities. As part 
of the ongoing reconfiguration of nation-states, education systems across the world institutionalize 
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cosmopolitanism that takes world society or ‘humanity’ as a primary reference. Summarizing recent cross-
national studies of education policies and school curricula, John Meyer observed: 
 
There is the rise of the individual person seen as a member of global society … And there is, consequently, the 
need to reorganize the conceptions of national society around notions of it being embedded in a world society, its 
capacity to progress in that world society (Meyer 2007: 264). 
 
This ongoing institutionalization of cosmopolitanism as a new logic of education is illustrated by the rise of 
human rights education that emphasizes international understanding, global awareness, and world citizenship 
(Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer 2007). As the United Nations (UN) and international non-governmental 
organizations promoted cosmopolitan conceptions and norms anchored in world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999; 
Lechner and Boli 2005), the education system came to be redefined as a vehicle for not only building the nation 
but also helping the individual acquire competencies and values to participate successfully in world society. 
 
The contemporary education system thus confronts an institutional contradiction between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Institutional sociologists Friedland and Alford (1991) originally introduced the theory of 
institutional contradiction to explain how individuals and organizations negotiate potential contradictions between 
logics of multiple institutions of society—the market, the state, democracy, family and religion. While their 
original formulation located multiple institutional logics and their contradictions at the societal level, subsequent 
studies have generalized it to include competitions among multiple logics at lower levels of analysis—within 
subsystems and organizations (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). As comparative studies have demonstrated that both 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism are institutionalized in education systems across the world, the question is then 
how the contradiction between the two institutional logics is negotiated in reality. Here, the theory of institutional 
contradiction offers useful conceptual tools to answer this question. 
 
3. Typical Solutions to Institutional Contradictions 
While several case studies have examined how competing institutional logics are negotiated within particular 
organizations (Heimer 1999; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Binder 2007), critical theorists Boltanski and Thévenot 
(2006) provide a general conceptual framework for studying how people resolve contradictions between 
institutional logics. Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that disagreement emerges when actors invoke different 
logics of justification grounded in different worldviews. Actors can move to resolve their disagreement only after 
they agree on which logic of justification they should use. Once they agree to use the same logic of justification, 
they can use it as a common frame of reference for interpreting the situation and evaluating proposed actions to 
take. 
 
More often than not, however, actors cannot agree on which logic of justification should be used as a common 
frame of reference. Actors then try to ‘resolve’ their disagreement by making a compromise between competing 
logics. In the case of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, a compromise would dictate that the education system 
should serve both the nation and the world. Here Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that a typical way of solidifying 
a compromise is 
 
to place objects composed of elements stemming from different worlds at the service of the common good and 
endow them with their own identity . … The multiplication of composite objects that corroborate one another and 
their identification with a common form thus help work out and stabilize a compromise (278–279). 
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This kind of compromise is found in sociological discussion of cosmopolitanism itself (Beck 2006; Calhoun 
2008; Delanty 2009). On the one hand, social theorists argue that the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism has 
to presuppose the stabilizing forces of the nation-state and nationalism. On the other hand, they suggest that 
nationalism can be modified in a cosmopolitan direction, to create ‘cosmopolitan nation-states’ and ‘cosmopolitan 
national citizens’. As these composite objects proliferate, a compromise between the two institutional logics 
appears more natural and acquires stability. In the case of the Japanese education system, the concepts of 
‘Japanese in the world’ (sekai no naka no nihonjin) and ‘cosmopolitan Japanese’ (kokusaitekina nihonjin) are the 
prominent examples of composites of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. 
 
While Boltanski and Thévenot suggest a multiplication of composite objects as a mechanism that helps stabilize 
compromises between different institutional logics, I propose a more general mechanism of stabilization that can 
be applied to both types of solution, prioritizing one institutional logic and making a compromise. This 
mechanism can be called ‘deep-structuration’: solutions to institutional contradictions get stabilized when they 
acquire ‘depth’ in the sense that ‘they are present in a relatively wide range of institutional spheres, practices, and 
discourses … taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedure that actors normally apply without 
being aware that they are applying them’ (Sewell 2005: 146). A solution becomes ‘deep-structural’ when it is 
inscribed into the institutional core of a given system. This is not only because people place in the institutional 
core conceptions and norms that they consider to be of fundamental importance. The institutional core also has 
the advantage of ‘path-dependence’ (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004) because it forms earlier than other, outer 
institutional layers of the system. Here, the Constitution is a good example. What is codified in the Constitution is 
enduring not simply because people believe in its fundamental legitimacy, but also because a vast number of 
everyday practices, policy discussions, legislations, and organizations within a given polity depend on the 
Constitution for their legitimacy. 
 
Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion of stabilization of solutions to institutional contradictions begs important 
questions concerning the politics of institutions. How do actors decide to adopt one solution over others? What 
enables them to institutionalize the adopted solution into the core of the system? While political contestations are 
part and parcel of any institution (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Stinchcombe 1997), institutional contradictions serve 
specifically as focal points of such contestations. To answer the questions of the political processes revolving 
around institutional contradictions, the next section proposes to combine the theory of institutional logics with 
that of social movements. 
 
4. Political Mechanisms in Resolving Institutional Contradictions 
A point of departure for studying the politics of institutions is the fact that they follow a life cycle: ‘successful 
institutionalization is preceded and followed by the emergence of new competitors or alternative models’ 
(Schneiberg and Clemens 2006: 218). Not only does the initial round of institutionalization of a solution involve 
political contestations, but what has been institutionalized also remains open to new contestations. Given the path-
dependent stability of the institutional core, new solutions are often ‘grafted’ or ‘layered’ onto the existing system 
without radically transforming its overall trajectory (Thelen 2004). However, there can also be ‘eventful’ 
transformations that entail a cascade of structural reconfigurations that fundamentally alter an overall trajectory of 
the system (Sewell 2005). Eventful institutional transformations are typically preceded by the long-term buildup 
of minor incremental changes that reach a certain threshold and create structural potentialities for significant 
institutional transformations (Pierson 2004). When those potentialities intersect with proper actions, the long-term 
build-ups and short-term actions can combine to transform the system as a whole (Abbott 2001). 
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At the initial adoption of a solution and at the peak of its contestation—two most critical moments in the cycle of 
institutional politics—‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Rao, Morrill and Zald 2000) play a crucial role in determining 
outcomes. They orchestrate three mechanisms to actualize potentialities for significant institutional 
transformations: ‘mobilization structures’, ‘political opportunities’ and ‘framing processes’ (McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald 1996). Mobilization structures (Zald and McCarthy 1987) include formal organizations and informal 
networks capable of mobilizing efforts to change existing institutional arrangements. Political opportunities 
(McAdam 1999) refer to structural openings in the political system; for example, social movements gain a new 
political opportunity when a significant elite realignment occurs within the system. Framing processes (Snow and 
Benford 1988) are signifying practices to increase the resonance of a given social movement with the public and 
garner their support. When actors manage to orchestrate these three mechanisms around structural potentialities 
that have built up, they are likely to succeed in either founding new institutions or transforming existing ones at 
the most fundamental level. 
 
Up to now, the theory of social movements has been applied to cases of actors outside of the political system who 
try to challenge existing laws and policies by influencing actors inside the system. However, I suggest that the 
theory can be also applied to policymakers who seek institutional transformations from inside the political system. 
That is, the mechanisms of mobilization structures, political opportunities and framing processes are conceptually 
general enough to cover any actors and collective actions that aim to transform institutions. For instance, 
mobilization structures for policymakers would mean political parties and state bureaucracies. To advance their 
reform agenda, policymakers have to mobilize sufficient support from their own parties and relevant ministries. In 
the context of postwar Japan, a majority in the Diet did not automatically guarantee an adequate mobilization 
structure for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This is not only because Japanese politicians were heavily 
dependent on the expertise of bureaucrats (Curtis 1999), but also because ‘subgovernments’, sets of party 
members and ministries that specialized in specific policy domains, emerged as crucial units of mobilization 
(Campbell 1984). Mobilization structures therefore include not simply the number of Diet seats that a given party 
has secured but also support from relevant ministries. 
 
Next, political opportunities for policymakers would mean significant realignments of actors inside and outside 
the political system. In the case of postwar Japan, such realignments include the merger of conservative political 
parties into the LDP in 1955, the LDP's temporary loss of power in 1993, the short-lived coalition of the LDP and 
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) from 1994 to 1996, and the relatively stable coalition of the LDP and New 
Komeito (NK) from 2000 to 2009. These realignments created political opportunities for some reforms and closed 
those for others. Moreover, in the context of the Japanese education system, the Japan Teachers Union (JTU) was 
an important actor outside the political system. Although the JTU did not have direct access to the government, it 
had generally succeeded in pressuring the LDP government not to carry out reforms that would significantly 
compromise the postwar settlement (Schoppa 1991; Aspinall 2001). The declining membership of the JTU, as 
well as the demise of its political ally the JSP in the 1990s, however, created a new political opportunity favorable 
to the LDP. Thus, the structure of political opportunities depends on shifting alignments and power relations 
among relevant actors inside and outside the political system. 
 
Finally, framing processes operate for both social-movement actors and policymakers. How actors frame and 
present their proposed reform influences the outcome of their reform attempt. Here, a crucial factor is ‘frame 
resonance’ (Benford and Snow 2000). Generally speaking, the more resonance a given frame can produce in the 
public, the more public support it can mobilize. The degree of resonance depends on the frame's credibility and 
salience. In the context of postwar Japanese politics, attempts to undo the Occupation reforms often had 
credibility problems because they were seen as dangerous regressions to the prewar period. Moreover, some 
reform attempts had greater success than others because they connected to social problems that were salient at the 
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time. As the next section illustrates, a key to the 2006 reform of the FLE was a ‘new-century frame’ that built on 
the widespread sense of crisis after Japan suffered its worst economic recession since World War II. 
 
Transposing the theory of social movements to the study of institutional logics in the context of the education 
system, I propose that only when political actors succeed in orchestrating mobilizing structures, political 
opportunities, and framing processes are they likely to succeed in either institutionalizing or modifying a solution 
to the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. In light of this synthetic theoretical 
framework, I will now proceed to analyze the history of postwar Japanese education. 
 
5. Japanese Education since World War II 
In this section, I divide the history of postwar Japanese education into three periods during which political actors 
adopted three distinct solutions to the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism: the 
institutionalization of cosmopolitanism as an antidote to nationalism in the FLE (1945–1950); the incremental 
modification of the original solution through a series of institutional layering to normalize a compromise between 
the two institutional logics (1951–1999) and the reformation of the FLE and deep-structuration of the compromise 
in the institutional core of the education system (2000–2006). 
 
The following historical analysis is based on three kinds of data. The first are laws regarding education that the 
Diet legislated. The second are official curricular guidelines, memos and reports produced by the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) [which was reformed and renamed the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT) in 2001]. The third are discussions by policymakers, i.e. politicians, bureaucrats and policy 
advisers, with regard to the first and second data—e.g. laws by the Diet and official education policies by the 
MOE (or MEXT). These discussions are documented in newspapers, parliamentary proceedings, publications by 
advisory councils, and committees and journals published by the MOE and MEXT. 
 
6. The Introduction of Cosmopolitanism, 1945–1950 
When Japan surrendered unconditionally on 15 August 1945, the most important goal for Japanese policymakers 
was to maintain the emperor-centered national polity. On the day after the Shōwa Emperor announced Japan's 
unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers, the MOE issued instructions commanding teachers to commit 
themselves to the ‘maintenance of the national polity according to the sacred pronouncement of His Majesty’.1 In 
the immediate aftermath of the war, the MOE had no plan to voluntarily reform the existing education system. 
 
When Higashikuniomiya Naruhiko formed a new cabinet on 17 August, however, he appointed Maeda Tamon as 
the minister of education. Maeda was anomalous for a Japanese policymaker at that time. In his youth, Maeda had 
been a student and follower of the Christian intellectual Nitobe Inazō, who had become the first under-secretary-
general of the League of Nations in 1920. Maeda himself had represented Japan at the International Labour 
Organization in Genevè from 1923 to 1925 and presided over the Museum of Japanese Culture in New York City 
from 1938 to 1941. In his memoir Sanshō Seishi (Maeda 1947), Maeda recounted fondly these overseas 
experiences as formative of his views and aspirations as an educator. He was a human carrier of the idea of world 
society that the League of Nations had begun to institutionalize before World War II. 
 
Maeda articulated his vision of the new Japanese education system during his nationwide radio speech on 9 
September: 
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Since 15 August, we have been living in a new era. But what is this new era? This new era sets Japan on one and 
only one path: without any military power, we will go forward with culture. As the truly ethical Japanese nation 
we shall contribute to progress of the world as a whole.2 
 
Maeda's vision of cosmopolitan education was laid out systematically in ‘The Educational Principles for Building 
a New Japan’ that the MOE issued on 15 September. The document consisted of a preamble and 11 articles that 
redefined the aims of Japanese education. As stated in the preamble, the MOE declared that the postwar education 
system should serve ‘the purpose of building a new Japan that contributes to world peace and the welfare of 
humanity’.3 
 
Although Maeda was unusual for his cosmopolitan orientation, he was also a creature of the prewar education 
system because ‘The Educational Principles for Building a New Japan’ continued to insist on the ‘maintenance of 
the national polity’. But the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) did not allow it. Having arrived 
at Yokohama on 28 August, SCAP pursued the elimination of militarist–nationalist ideologies and the promotion 
of democracy more extensively than Japanese policymakers were prepared to do on their own initiatives. On 31 
October, SCAP issued a directive to expel militarist teachers immediately from schools. On 31 December, SCAP 
suspended the teaching of moral education, Japanese history, and geography—three academic subjects that had 
promoted nationalism in prewar education—and ordered the MOE to delete militarist and nationalist contents 
from existing textbooks. SCAP's policies affected Maeda himself on 4 January 1946, when a directive was issued 
to expel militarists from public offices. According to the directive, Maeda was defined as a ‘militarist’ since he 
had taken part in the Imperial Aid Association during the war. Maeda resigned on 10 January. 
 
Abe Yoshinari, the principal of the First High School at the time, succeeded Maeda. The most significant event 
during Abe's four-month tenure was the arrival of the United States Education Mission. The Mission, which 
consisted of 27 American educators, came to Japan on 5 March 1946. The Mission submitted the ‘Report of the 
United States Education Mission to Japan’ to SCAP on 30 March. Criticizing the Japanese education system for 
its over-centralization and over-standardization, the Report emphasized the importance of the individual as the 
foundation of democratic Japan and added that democratization should be carried out in reference to world 
society: ‘The overall objective should be the promotion of democratic Japanese education within a world society 
committed to non-aggression and peace’ (United States Education Mission to Japan 1946: 15). Indeed, the aims of 
the new Japanese education should be ‘in harmony with the fundamental principles laid down in the Charter of 
the United Nations Organizations and in the draft Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization’ (ibid: 7). For the rest of the Occupation, both SCAP and Japanese policymakers used the 
Report as a basis for planning education reforms (Tsuchimochi 1993; Shibata 2005). 
 
Soon after the release of the Report, a political chaos followed the first postwar general election on 10 April. The 
Liberal Party led by Hatoyama Ichiro won the largest number of seats in the Imperial Diet, but SCAP intervened 
and banned him from assuming public office. When Yoshida Shigeru finally emerged as prime minister on 22 
May, Abe resigned and recommended Tanaka Kōtarō as his successor. Yoshida accepted Abe's recommendation, 
and Tanaka became the new minister of education. 
 
Tanaka was as unusual as Maeda for policymakers at that time. Tanaka had been a law professor at the University 
of Tokyo who specialized in ‘world law’, the comparative study of laws across civilizations to uncover their 
common moral foundations. Tanaka was also a Roman Catholic. Since Tanaka believed strongly in the 
importance of moral education, he had initially supported the idea of keeping the Imperial Rescript on Education 
that had defined the moral basis of prewar Japanese education (Sugihara 1983). By the time the Report was 
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published in April 1946, however, it became clear that it would be impossible to keep the Rescript. Instead, 
Tanaka began to formulate plans to create democratically—through legislation—something similar to the Rescript 
for the postwar education system.4 By the end of September, the MOE produced the first draft of the FLE. Even 
though Yoshida replaced Tanaka with Takahashi Sei'ichiro, a professor of economics at Keio University, in 
January 1947, the MOE continued to work on the draft and submitted the final draft to the Privy Council for 
review on 5 March. The government made one last revision according to the Council's recommendation and 
submitted a bill to the Imperial Diet on 12 March. 
 
The bill consisted of a preamble and 11 articles, just like the previously issued ‘Educational Principles for 
Building a New Japan’. The preamble specified the spirit of the FLE as follows: 
 
We have established the Constitution of Japan and declared our determination to create a democratic and cultured 
nation, and contribute to world peace and the welfare of humankind. Realization of this ideal depends 
fundamentally on the power of education. We shall educate human beings who revere the dignity of the individual 
as well as seek truth and peace ardently. We must also thoroughly promote education that aims to create a culture 
that is universal and yet full of uniqueness.5 
 
The FLE did not define recipients of education as Japanese but ‘human beings who revere the dignity of the 
individual’. Although ‘the Constitution of Japan’ implied that the bill was framed in terms of the Japanese nation-
state, the FLE nonetheless emphasized cosmopolitanism in terms of the contribution to ‘world peace and the 
welfare of humankind’ and the education of ‘human beings’. This signaled a significant departure from the prewar 
education system founded on the idea of the imperial nation. The Diet discussed the preamble and each of the 11 
articles, but it suggested no revision. The bill was passed on 31 March. 
 
Concurrent with the passage of the FLE, the MOE issued the Draft Course of Study to provide teachers with 
curricular guidelines that translated the Law into more concrete terms. The first chapter of the Draft Course of 
Study defined the ‘overall aims of education’ concerning four dimensions of human life: individual, family, 
society, and economy. The section on ‘society’ contained nine goals, from the first: to ‘cultivate attitudes to love 
the whole of humanity, revere liberty and the dignity of other persons, forgive others, and respect their opinions’; 
to the ninth and final goal: to ‘understand world history, geography, science, arts, morality, and religions, and 
acquire the will to strive for peace in cooperation with the rest of the world’.6 This emphasis on world society in 
the school curriculum enjoyed popular support. After UNESCO was established in November 1946, Japanese 
teachers, educators and university professors in several cities began to form non-governmental organizations 
based on the constitution of UNESCO. Education for world peace seemed to have a strong resonance with 
Japanese teachers because they were often remorseful for having sent their students to the war (Dower 1999). In 
May 1948, they established the National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan. The Japanese 
government then joined UNESCO in June 1951, three months before signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. At 
the 1951 General Conference of UNESCO, Maeda, the former minister of education who attended the conference 
as a Japanese representative, declared that ‘the spirit of UNESCO is the guiding principle for reconstructing Japan 
as a peaceful, democratic nation’.7 In the same year, the Diet passed a law to establish the Japanese National 
Commission for UNESCO within the MOE for the purpose of promoting domestic educational activities that 
aimed to accomplish the objectives of UNESCO. 
 
In short, during the early years of the Occupation, political actors deep-structurated cosmopolitanism into the 
Japanese education system in the form of the FLE. Cosmopolitanism was further reinforced through the Draft 
Course of Study and the National Commission for UNESCO. Both Japanese and American policymakers made 
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efforts to institutionalize cosmopolitanism because they considered it a corrective to the prewar education system 
that had promoted militarism and nationalism. That is, the first postwar solution to the institutional contradiction 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism aimed to prioritize the latter over the former. This solution was deep-
structurated into the institutional core of the education system because the U.S. Occupation created a new political 
opportunity for promoting the cosmopolitanism that the UN system began to institutionalize at the global level; 
SCAP, the U.S. Education Mission, and the MOE then provided mobilization structures for the institutionalization 
of cosmopolitanism; and cosmopolitanism and its auxiliary concepts, such as ‘world peace’, resonated strongly 
with the Japanese policymakers and public. Thus, when the drastic circumstance of the Occupation temporarily 
made the Japanese education system institutionally malleable, the political actors effected significant institutional 
transformation—the embracement of cosmopolitanism in place of nationalism. 
 
7. Rehabilitation of Nationalism, 1951–1999 
As the Cold War began to intensify in the 1950s, however, the domestic political environment became conducive 
to a comeback of nationalism. By the time the Korean War started, the Occupation authority had already shifted 
its policies from comprehensive democratization to quick remilitarization. As a part of this ‘reverse course’ that 
SCAP initiated, the Japanese government established the Japan Self-Defense Forces in August 1950. In this 
process of rebuilding Japan's military capabilities on the eve of independence, conservative policymakers argued 
that Japanese youth should be taught patriotism. Prime Minister Yoshida criticized the postwar education system 
for failing to ‘thoroughly teach youths that the history of Japan is unparalleled and that the Japanese land is the 
most beautiful in the world, for the purpose of cultivating love of the nation (aikokushin)’.8 Amano Tenyū, the 
minister of education appointed by Yoshida, also advocated patriotism on several occasions during the 1951 
session of the Diet.9 
 
The conservative policymakers’ attempts to re-emphasize nationalism in education gathered force when the 
Liberal Party and Japan Democratic Party merged into the LDP on 15 November 1955, securing a majority in the 
Diet. In January 1956, Kiyose Ichirō became the first minister of education under the LDP government. He 
openly criticized the FLE, for he felt that ‘the Law connects the individual to the world directly, but it totally 
lacks a concept of the nation that mediates the two’.10 On 8 February 1956, the LDP government submitted to the 
Diet a proposal to set up a council to review the postwar education system, especially the FLE, because the 
system was ‘reformed too rapidly in the peculiar situation under the Occupation. As a result, it is incompatible 
with the reality [of Japanese society] in more than a few respects’.11 As a representative of the LDP government, 
Kiyose argued that he had no problem with the FLE, except that ‘when I read the Law, I cannot help wondering, 
“Where on earth does it mention loyalty to our Japanese nation?”’12 He continued, 
 
Some moral principles are universal, but we the Japanese people have our own traditions. Moral education comes 
down to articulating Japanese ideals based on Japanese traditions… I don't think the eight moral principles 
defined in the Law fit perfectly with Japanese ideals.13 
 
In the end, the proposal did not pass the Diet partly because there were other more urgent bills to discuss and 
partly because the opposition parties and unions—most notably the JSP and JTU—and major national newspapers 
strongly criticized the proposal as a dangerous regression to prewar Japanese education. Thus, while the end of 
the Occupation and the resultant realignment of political parties created a political opportunity for conservative 
policymakers to reinsert nationalism into the institutional core of the education system, they lacked adequate 
mobilization structures to surmount resistance from the opposition parties as well as from the public. 
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Instead of trying to reform the FLE, the LDP government pursued more tractable reforms through its connections 
with the MOE. Between 1957 and 1972, all three LDP prime ministers were former high-ranking bureaucrats: 
Kishi Nobusuke (1957–1960), Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) and Sato Eisaku (1964–1972). This consolidation of 
‘bureaucratic-elite rule’ was coterminous with the extensive interpenetration between state bureaucracies and the 
LDP government (Allinson 1993; Pempel 1998; Curtis 1999). In 1958, the MOE issued a new Course of Study 
and defined moral education as the central curricular component. The new Course of Study stated that moral 
education was based on the ‘fundamental principles of education defined in the Fundamental Law of Education’; 
however, it went on to insist that 
 
the aim of moral education is to educate Japanese people (Nihonjin) who never lose reverence for humanity, … 
[who] make efforts toward the creation of a unique culture and the development of a democratic nation and 
society, and [who] voluntarily contribute to peaceful world society and pioneer the future.14 
 
Unlike the FLE, the new Course of Study defined recipients of education explicitly as ‘Japanese people’ and 
added a new emphasis on the Japanese people with ‘unique culture’ to the existing school curriculum. 
 
The new Course of Study restored emphasis on nationalism through moral education, while the postwar Japanese 
economy was taking off under the guidance of the developmental state (Johnson 1995). When Ikeda Hayato 
became the prime minister in 1960, he launched the famous ‘Income Doubling Plan’. As part of the government's 
developmental strategies, the MOE issued Education and Japan's Development (Nihon no Seichō to Kyōiku) in 
November 1962. This report analyzed the Japanese education system in terms of its effects on national economic 
development, drawing extensively on cross-national statistics and documents published by UNESCO and OECD. 
Specifically, the report recognized that ‘the idea that education is a crucial factor of economic growth has been 
accepted across the world’ (MOE 1962: 1). Indeed, the 1960s was the decade during which UNESCO and OECD 
produced a number of studies and recommendations that defined education systems as vehicles for national 
economic development (Papadopoulos 1994; Valderrama 1995). This model of education that the UN 
organizations promoted was adopted en masse by former colonies that gained independence. Thus, during the 
1960s, the economic development of the nation-state emerged as a primary aim of education (Meyer and Hannan 
1979; Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992). 
 
Against the backdrop of worldwide legitimation of the nation-state, Araki Masuo, the minister of education 
appointed by Ikeda, requested the Central Council for Education (CCE) in 1963 to make recommendations to 
improve postsecondary education to sustain high-level economic growth. In 1966, the CCE published ‘The Ideal 
Person’ as a supplement to its recommendation, for members of the Council were concerned that ‘the phenomenal 
economic growth brought about selfish and hedonistic tendencies among Japanese’. The report continued, 
 
Today no individual or ethnic group exists without being part of a nation. The nation is the most organic and 
powerful institution. The individual's happiness and security depend largely on the nation. A path to contribution 
to humankind is also made possible by the nation.15 
 
This passage illustrated the ongoing rearticulation of the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. 
During the immediate postwar period, cosmopolitanism had been prioritized over nationalism. In the 1960s, 
however, the idea of nation regained legitimacy, as national economic development came to be defined as a 
primary aim of education worldwide. Moreover, as Japan achieved the ‘economic miracle’, an increasing number 
of Japanese began to re-evaluate their national identity in a positive light (Befu 2001). The Tokyo Olympics in 
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1964 also signaled to many Japanese the rising status of their nation in the world. As a result, nationalism came to 
be redefined as compatible with cosmopolitanism. 
 
Policymakers began to consolidate the emerging compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism more 
clearly in the 1970s when the perception of the interdependency of the world grew due to two major historical 
events. In 1971, the Bretton Woods system was canceled, increasing the interdependency of national economies. 
Then the 1973 Arab-Israeli War led to a gasoline price hike worldwide, highlighting the dependency of the 
Japanese economy on the rest of the world. In addition, as the Japanese economy became the third largest in the 
world, Japan was expected to play a larger role in world society in providing aid to developing countries. This led 
the CCE to make the following recommendation in 1974 and to educate ‘the Japanese people living in world 
society’ (kokusai shakai ni ikiru Nihonjin): 
 
As world society faces a number of worldwide problems … the necessity for international cooperation and the 
spirit of solidarity are emphasized more than ever. To respond to this call from the world, we must recognize it is 
extremely important for our country to make the Japanese people sufficiently internationalized.16 
 
In response to the CCE's recommendation, the Japanese government lobbied the UN to establish United Nations 
University in Tokyo in 1975, and the MOE started recruiting native English speakers as assistant English teachers 
in 1977. 
 
At the same time, however, the new Course of Study in 1977 named Kimigayo as the national anthem. The new 
Course of Study also put ‘greater emphasis on moral education than before’.17 Moreover, in 1982, the MOE 
inspected new editions of history textbooks and suggested that the ‘invasion’ (shinryaku) of East Asia during 
World War II could be reworded as ‘advancement’ (shinshutsu) into the region. Thus, the new educational 
preoccupation, to adapt the Japanese people to the increasingly global world, was coupled with continuing efforts 
to rehabilitate nationalism in education. 
 
The coupling of nationalism and cosmopolitanism was further stabilized during Nakasone Yasuhiro's tenure as 
prime minister from 1982 to 1987. When Nakasone became prime minister, education reform was one of his top 
priorities. In addition, after he took office, a series of high-profile youth crimes occurred, which deepened the 
impression that the Japanese education system had serious problems in spite of its apparent success (Hood 2004). 
Instead of receiving recommendations by the CCE and other councils under the MOE, Nakasone wanted to direct 
education reforms under his Cabinet. While Nakasone had to make compromises with the MOE and education-
specialist members of his own party who were resistant to drastic education reforms (Schoppa 1991), he finally 
managed to set up the Ad Hoc Educational Council in August 1984. From 1985 through 1987, the Council 
published a total of four reports. 
 
One of the most important issues that the Council debated was how ‘internationalization’ (kokusaika) necessitated 
the education of cosmopolitan Japanese (sekai no naka no nihonjin) (Lincicome 1993). The Council argued that as 
the world entered the new phase of internationalization, 
 
We must establish education to help students recognize that good cosmopolitans are good Japanese, who cultivate 
love of the nation and embody the unique Japanese culture, while educating them to deepen their understanding of 
the cultures and traditions of other nations (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987: 72). 
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Here again, emphasis on world society was coupled tightly with emphasis on the Japanese nation. This kind of 
cosmopolitanism–nationalism composite appeared recurrently in all four reports that the Council issued; for 
example, the second report reiterated that no matter how important it was to ‘educate students to develop a 
broadly international, planetary, and cosmopolitan perspective’, students must be also taught ‘to develop love of 
the nation as Japanese people . . . and embody the uniqueness of Japanese society and culture’ (ibid: 117). 
Building on the reform discussion in the 1970s, the Council reports made progress in multiplying 
cosmopolitanism–nationalism composites in education discourses to stabilize the compromise between the two 
institutional logics. 
 
Policymakers continued to redefine the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism as symbiotic rather 
than antithetical during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s. In 1996, the CCE issued a report that defined ‘ikiru 
chikara’ (zest for living) as the key disposition that new generations of students should acquire: 
 
We conclude that what children will need from now on is a competence to find tasks by themselves, learn 
voluntarily, think independently, decide and act autonomously, and solve problems effectively, no matter how 
society changes …. We call such a competence ‘ikiru chikara’, which is necessary to live in society characterized 
by drastic changes (MOE 1996: 20). 
 
The CCE report went on to define this disposition as inseparable from the ‘education of “Japanese who live in 
world society”’ (ibid: 21). That is, the ‘society characterized by drastic changes’ for which students needed a ‘zest 
for living’ was not defined simply as a specific national society but as the entire world. To implement the CCE's 
recommendation, the MOE introduced ‘integrated studies’ into the school curriculum in 1998.18 In the new 
Course of Study, the MOE also made the English language officially mandatory in junior high schools and 
recommended that elementary schools should consider using periods of integrated study for English lessons and 
international exchange activities (MEXT 2002). 
 
While emphasizing the student's ‘zest for living’ in a global world, the 1996 CCE report also emphasized the 
importance of nationalism in education: 
 
In order to help students develop attitudes to understand and respect foreign cultures and co-exist with foreign 
peoples, it is crucial to educate them to have deep understandings of our national history, culture, and traditions 
(MOE 1996: 74). 
 
In the same year, the MOE issued the administrative directive to require public schools to accompany the hoisting 
of the Hinomaru flag with Kimigayo. After the LDP came back to power in January 1996, the LDP-led coalition 
government succeeded in legislating a new law in August 1999 that formally designated the Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem. Given the new legislation, the MOE issued another administrative 
directive to reinforce its earlier policy that required public schools to observe the Hinomaru and sing Kimigayo at 
important school events. 
 
Thus, the education reforms from the mid-1950s through the 1990s reconfigured the relationship between 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Policymakers no longer saw nationalism as the antithesis of cosmopolitanism. 
In fact, the two institutional logics of education came to be rearticulated as not only compatible but also beneficial 
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and indispensable to each other. To be sure, the compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism happened 
only at the level of the Course of Study and policy recommendations. Despite its dominance of the government, 
the LDP still lacked a set of adequate mobilization structures, political opportunities and frames to institutionalize 
the compromise into the core of the education system: the FLE continued to prioritize the world over the nation. 
Nonetheless, the incremental changes in outer institutional layers of the education system did normalize 
composites of the world and the nation, such as ‘Japan in world society’ and ‘cosmopolitan Japanese’. Indeed, 
this normalization was going to gain momentum at the turn of the century. 
 
8. Education for the New Century, 2000–2006 
While the end of the recession was not yet in sight, policymakers began to use the word ‘crisis’ to describe the 
education system. In September 2000, the mid-term report of the National Commission on Education Reform 
(NCER) stated, ‘Japanese education is at a crossroads right now, facing a crisis, even the possibility of collapse. 
The current situations surrounding education—bullying, school refusal, school violence, and classroom 
disruptions—are extremely serious’.19 Indeed, the feeling of crisis permeated not only the education system but 
also the country at large. According to government statistics, the percentage of Japanese who thought that Japan 
was headed in the wrong direction increased from 31.4 in 1990 to 72.2 in 1997.20 The number of suicides also 
increased significantly in the late 1990s. 
 
At this historical juncture, the language of ‘crisis’ intersected with that of ‘new century’. The NCER called for 
fundamental reforms of the Japanese education system to solve the crisis, so that Japan could start fresh in the 
new century. The NCER final report in December 2000 recommended that Japanese citizens and the government 
should debate how to reform the FLE for the new century. Given the NCER's recommendation, the MEXT 
launched ‘The 21st-Century Educational Renewal Plan’ in January 2001 by calling for fundamental education 
reforms in the eschatological language of the new century. As education minister Machimura Nobutaka put it, the 
Plan aimed to ‘clarify overall guidelines for education reforms, which is one of the most important tasks 
necessary for realizing “New Japan”’.21 In November, the MEXT proceeded to request that the CCE explore the 
possibility of reforming the FLE. Thus, although earlier calls for reforming the FLE had been perceived as a 
dangerous regression to prewar education, the widespread sense of crisis in the 1990s reversed the perception: a 
reform of the FLE was reframed as a necessary and legitimate policy agenda for adapting the Japanese education 
system to the realities of the new century. 
 
The year 2001 also marked an important structural change in the political system: the central government reform. 
Since the end of World War II, the Japanese state had consisted of a total of 22 ministries. In 1998, however, the 
Diet passed a bill to strengthen the power of the Cabinet Office and consolidate functions of state bureaucracies. 
This bill had been proposed in the midst of the worst postwar recession in order to make the political system 
capable of planning and implementing reforms more efficiently. The bill took effect in 2001, reducing the number 
of ministries to 12 and consolidating some of their previous functions into the Cabinet Office. This structural 
change of the Japanese political system increased the power of the government, especially that of the prime 
minister, to initiate reforms (Takenaka 2006). Put another way, the prime minister acquired greater power to 
discipline subgovernments and other mobilization structures to pursue his reform agendas. In the context of 
education, this meant that the education subgovernment, in particular the MEXT that had once resisted 
Nakasone's reform attempt, lost some leverage against reform-minded prime ministers. 
 
Moreover, this formal institutional change of the political system happened against a backdrop of a decline of 
opposition parties and their support organizations. While the JTU had begun to lose membership slowly in the 
1960s, it declined sharply after its leadership struggle intensified in the 1980s, and eventually led its leftwing 
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faction to break away to form the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union in 1991 (Aspinall 2001). The JSP, hitherto 
the JTU's political ally, also lost public support drastically after it partnered with the LDP to form a coalition 
government in 1994. These shifts in power relations among relevant actors inside and outside the political system 
created a new political opportunity for conservative policymakers to further institutionalize the compromise 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the education system. Thus, mobilization structures, political 
opportunity, and a frame necessary for reforming the FLE were beginning to coalesce in March 2003 when the 
CCE recommended that the FLE should be reformed to meet the new challenges of the 21st century. 
 
Koizumi Jun'ichirō, then prime minister of the LDP–NK coalition government, however, did not immediately 
pursue a reform of the FLE because he prioritized other legislative agendas, such as pension and health care 
reforms and privatization of the postal service. The coalition government took a step toward reforming the FLE in 
2005, only after Koizumi led the LDP to win more than half of the seats in the lower house. Prior to the 2005 
election, the NK had been reluctant to pursue such reforms. Since the LDP became capable of forming a 
government on its own, the NK agreed to the reform, so as to main a coalition partner of the LDP. Nonetheless, 
the LDP and the NK continued to disagree about how to introduce ‘patriotism’ (aikokushin) into the new FLE. 
While the LDP insisted on the phrase, ‘to love our nation’ (kuni o aisuru), the NK wanted to tone down patriotism 
and suggested another phrase, ‘to value our nation’ (kuni o taisetsu ni suru). In April 2006, the NK finally agreed 
with the LDP about adopting the phrase ‘love our nation’, provided that the nation should be understood as 
excluding state institutions, and that other phrases should be added to affirm the educational importance of 
respecting other countries and contributing to world society. The LDP accommodated the NK's demand so that it 
could maintain the coalition as evidence of broader political support for the FLE reform. In May that year, the 
LDP–NK government sent a reform bill to the lower house of the Diet. 
 
Although opposition parties objected to the bill strongly, they were also divided. The Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), the largest opposition party, agreed with the government on the principle of patriotism but disagreed about 
the letter. The DPJ argued that the phrase ‘to love Japan’ (Nihon o aisuru) was better than ‘love our nation’ 
because it did not have a connotation of the state-centered ultra-nationalism reminiscent of prewar Japan that the 
word ‘nation’ still evoked. The Communist and Socialist Parties opposed squarely the idea of legally specifying 
the inculcation of patriotism as an aim of education. The Communist Party criticized the proposed reform for 
prioritizing the state over the individual. Similarly, the Socialist Party argued that the proposed reform ‘tries to 
bind the individual's thought by law, which amounts to a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of 
thought …. Moreover, “patriotism” means demanding our loyalty to a nation [Japan] that would engage in war 
abroad’.22 
 
Because of these disagreements, the government and the opposition parties could not work out bipartisan 
amendments of the bill during the 2006 regular session of the Diet; however, the LDP–NK coalition voted to 
extend deliberation of the bill to the next session. Then, during the 2006 summer recess, the LDP elected a new 
leader, Abe Shinzō. Abe was ideologically more conservative than his predecessor Koizumi. For example, Abe 
and two other LDP politicians had published the book Declaration of the ‘Conservative Revolution’: Why We 
Chose to be Anti-Liberal (‘Hoshu Kakumei’ Sengen: Anchi Riberaru e no Sentaku) in 1996. The book showed 
that Abe was an unabashed nationalist. He lamented that ‘it was a shame that the Diet passed the “apology” 
resolution on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II’, for he did not think that Japan should apologize 
to Asian countries it had invaded during World War II (Abe, Kurimoto, and Etō 1996: 54). Abe was sworn into 
the office of prime minister on 26 September 2006, and he recalled the Diet for a special session. The lower house 
resumed a discussion of the reform bill on 25 October, but the LDP–NK government and opposition parties still 
could not reach a compromise. On 12 December, the very last day of the special session, the government moved 
to vote on the bill. Since the LDP–NK coalition had a majority in the Diet, the reform bill was passed while 
members of the opposition parties boycotted the vote in protest. 
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The preamble of the new FLE added ‘inheritance of traditions’ as an overarching educational objective. The 
second article also stated that one of the most fundamental goals of Japanese education was to ‘cultivate attitudes 
to respect tradition and culture, and love our nation that created them’.23 These changes signaled greater 
significance of the Japanese nation for education policies and school curricula, compared with the old FLE that 
defined students primarily as human beings. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the new FLE did not 
simply re-entrench nationalism. Rather, the new FLE deep-structurated the existing compromise between 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism that the earlier reforms had already built up. While the new FLE did introduce 
the phrase emphasizing national identity and patriotism, it also retained the commitment to ‘world peace and the 
welfare of humanity’ in the preamble and added to the second article the new phrase ‘respect other countries and 
cultivate attitudes to contribute to the peace and progress of world society’. This compromise between the two 
institutional logics was evinced by the contents of the 2008 Course of Study based on the new FLE. On the one 
hand, the new Course of Study required budō (traditional Japanese martial arts) in physical education in junior 
high schools. On the other hand, it required English from fifth grade and expanded geography education in junior 
high schools.24 Taken together, these curricular changes under the new FLE suggest that the trajectory of the 
Japanese education system was now firmly anchored in the compromise between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
9. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper has combined the theories of institutional logics and social movements to examine how Japanese 
political actors negotiated the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the 
education system since World War II. My historical analysis has shown that political actors originally prioritized 
cosmopolitanism over nationalism in the aftermath of the war. In the subsequent decades, conservative 
policymakers rehabilitated nationalism by redefining its relationship with cosmopolitanism as synthetic rather 
than antithetical. They created nationalism–cosmopolitanism composites, such as ‘cosmopolitan Japanese’, to 
stabilize the compromise between the two institutional logics. The composites populated the outer institutional 
layers of the education system at first. When the new century frame, strong mobilization structures, and greater 
political opportunity coalesced in the early 2000s, however, conservative policymakers, led by the institutional 
entrepreneurs Koizumi and Abe, succeeded in deep-structurating the compromise between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism into the institutional core of the education system. 
 
The 2006 reform of the FLE is of vital importance for the Japanese education system because it ‘locked in’ the 
previously built-up institutional trajectory. The reforms that conservative political actors had implemented since 
the end of the Occupation could have been reversed if the FLE had continued to prioritize cosmopolitanism over 
nationalism; however, as the institutional core of the education system now legitimates the compromise between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism, the latter is likely to persist even if globalization progresses further. In turn, no 
matter how much conservative political actors would like to promote nationalism in education, they cannot 
implement nationalist reforms without incorporating cosmopolitanism. In short, the 2006 reform shows that the 
Japanese education system has evolved into a state apparatus of ‘cosmopolitan nation-building’, where nation and 
world society are conjoined as a composite institutional logic. 
 
This paper demonstrates the fruitfulness of studying transformations of the education system in terms of political 
contestations over contradictions between different institutional logics. The institutional contradictions are very 
likely to continue to serve as focal points of political contestations and generate more data that can help social 
scientists better understand the evolving relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in an increasingly 
global world. 
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